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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has become focused on
developing the capability to rapidly respond to emerging crises. Strategic and operation
planning play key roles in order to effectively implement this concept. During the
planning process, separate courses of action (COAs) are developed. These COAs are
evaluated based upon their operational effect, resource availability, nuclear and
transportation feasibility.
Currently, transportation feasibility assessments are based on the resources
contained within a full Unit Type Code (UTC). Some COAs are eliminated based on
these factors. However, most deployments occur at reduced levels. Situational factors,
such as the number of aircraft, type of deployment, duration of the deployment, and
availability of resources from other locations, can significantly reduce the logistics
footprint of a deploying base.
Additionally, full-UTC planning factors reduce the planner’s knowledge of airlift
requirements until information regarding tailoring is returned from the base. As a result,
precious time is consumed, and potentially favorable COAs may be eliminated
erroneously.
By developing a forecasting tool to identify the critical factors in tailoring, and
their effect on the size of the package deployed, planners can quickly evaluate
deployment scenarios, providing more accurate assessments regarding plan feasibility
and transportation supportability.
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ESTIMATING RESOURCES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT MULTI-ECHELON F-15
DEPLOYMENTS

I. Introduction

Background
During the Cold War, the United States military planning philosophy was
centered on large conflicts with significant build up time. However, with the fall of the
Soviet Union and with instability in many areas of the world, the United States has
become focused on developing the capability to rapidly respond to emerging crises.
Efficient strategic and operational planning are key factors in developing the
ability to rapidly respond to emerging crises. To foster rapid deployment, many planning
tools and processes have been developed. However, Air Force planners do not have a
tool to estimate the amount of cargo and the number of personnel required to support
different quantities and types of given weapons systems.
Currently, planners are forced to tailor generic Unit Type Codes (UTC) to meet
the requirements of the mission at hand. When weapon systems are tasked at sub-UTC
levels, support planners do not have the tools required to estimate the cargo and
passengers that they need to support the tasked package. The result is a lack of
predictability regarding the amount of resources during the operation. This lack of
predictability hinders the ability to effectively plan in short periods of time.
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Models proposed by the Rand Corporation produced cargo packages for F-15
deployments based on decision rule processes. These decision rules attempted to
accomplish UTC tailoring automatically, based on various input factors. However, these
models have methodological issues that hinder their use in developing resource
estimations.
In order to understand the contents of a deployment package, a model must be
developed to accurately describe historical deployment requirements. This model can
provide resource estimations, and can also serve as a baseline for future endeavors into
automated resource estimation tools.
Problem Statement
Decision makers at all levels need to have access to realistic support
requirements, tailored to the quantity of weapon systems required by the current mission.
There is a large quantity of data regarding what was actually deployed to support an array
of weapon systems. These data can be used to create a model that provides nearinstantaneous support estimates, facilitating the planning process. The purpose of this
research is to collect and analyze this data to develop a model to estimate the resources
required to support a given number, of a given type of airframe.
Research Question
Can deployment processes be improved by providing a model to predict the resources required to
support F-15E deployments under different scenarios?

Investigative Questions
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In order to meet the goals of this research, it is necessary to answer the following
questions:
1) What are the significant factors determining the number of passengers and amount of
cargo required to support a deployment?
2) How effective have previous models been in estimating real-world deployment
requirements?
A) What are the models underlying assumptions?
B) Do the models’ outputs properly predict the composition of actual
deployments?
3) Can a model be constructed that is more robust than existing models?
4) What factors must future models account for to produce effective estimates?
5) What precision and significance can a regression model provide regarding resource
estimations?
Research Methodology
The methodology used in the research was a two-level investigation based on data
collected from the 1St Logistics Readiness Squadron, Langley, Virginia and the 48th
Logistics Readiness Squadron, RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom. The data was
collected form historical deployment files, and was coded by the number of deploying
aircraft, the short tons of cargo deployed, the number of passengers deployed, whether
the deployment was for Air Expeditionary Force or other activities, the composition of
the deployed location (aggregating with other aircraft versus not aggregating), and the
planned duration of the deployment.
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The data gathered in the original data collection period (32 points) was then used
to develop two regression models. The first measured the effect of the number of
deploying aircraft, the type of location, and the type of deployment on the number of
passengers deployed. The second regression model measured the effect of the number of
deploying aircraft, the type of location, and the type of deployment on the short tons of
cargo deployed.
Finally, the models were validated for their ability to significantly predict
resource requirements, and the precision with which their predictions actually reflect real
requirements. This validation occurred with 15 data points gathered during a secondary
data collection.
Scope and Limitations
This research only deals with F-15 aircraft, and does not apply to other airframes.
Rather, this investigation attempts to establish a methodology that could be applied to
other necessary combat platforms (tanks, airframes, hospitals, depots, etc). Additionally,
this model does not account for items deployed from another location to support an F-15
package (barriers, Major Command support, etc.) As a result, this model will not, by
itself, provide a robust tool to facilitate planning of a diverse deployment package.
This research does not specifically account for items that are available at the
deployed site, such as water, fuel, vehicles, etc. However, this model’s scope is to
predict the resources required to move from the deploying location. The model is able to
perform despite this limitation.
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This methodology does not give exact resource estimations, but provides a
flexible range for planners to use when planning to mobilize forces. As a result, the
model does not provide specifics regarding what resources will be deployed, only an
aggregate estimation regarding how much is required.
Finally, this research investigates the resources required from the deploying
location, and does not assess the resources required to support downrange operations.
For example, if fuel is purchased locally, it is not a resource required from the deploying
location, however, it is still a resource required at the deployed location. Thus this model
as developed would have to be combined with other information to estimate the resources
required to support an F-15 deployment.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview

This chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to this research effort. It
begins with an explanation of the different types of joint planning: Deliberate and Crisis
Action. The Department of Defense’s Joint Planning Model follows, which explains the
merging of the two types of joint planning into a single process. A description of Air
Force planning follows, explaining manpower and equipment force packages, included
within the Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging System (MEFPAK). The process
of tailoring UTCs during Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning is described, including
key variables considered in the tailoring process. Finally, a description of previous
attempts to estimate deployment resource requirements is provided. An investigation of
these models establishes the need to describe historical deployment resource
requirements.
Background
As the Air Force transitions to capabilities-based planning, the need for rapid,
accurate planning increases. In order to compare multiple scenarios for logistics
feasibility, rapid forecasts for operational packages must be available. These forecasts
allow for rapid selection of a feasible course of action when responding to arising crises.
There are numerous factors that impact the composition of resource packages
required to support an operational package. These factors are considered when a joint
plan is developed, and affect the size and selection for a resource package.
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Many attempts have been made to automate and hasten the planning process.
These attempts have had limited success, limiting their applicability when trying to
estimate resource requirements tailored to a specific scenario. These efforts will be
detailed in the literature review.
Joint Planning
The task of planning and mobilizing the four military services in response to an
arising crisis is critical to the defense of our national interests. To guide the process, the
Department of Defense has created a complex architecture designed to facilitate planning
for a wide range of scenarios with varying planning horizons. Two types of plans are
central to joint planning, deliberate and crisis action plans. They provide a means to
respond to immediate crises, and plan for anticipated crises that may arise in the future.
The joint planning process provides a framework to consider the output of each type of
planning into an executable plan.
Deliberate Planning
Deliberate Planning involves speculation of the nature and location of a threat that
may develop. Deliberate Planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint
operation plans for contingencies in accordance with national strategic policy (Logistics
Readiness Officer Logistics Plans Module, 2003:20).
The Deliberate Planning process is initiated when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
issue the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JCSP). This plan assigns tasks and resources,
identifies broad scenarios for planning, and guides the strategic planning effort (Logistics
Readiness Officer Logistics Plans Module, 2003:24).
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The planning process continues by assigning a supported commander, that is, a
commander who will be required to implement the plan should the need arise. The
supported commander issues a Letter of Intent (LOI) which identifies the agencies
involved in the planning process.
After the LOI is issued, a Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) is developed
based on guidance and requirements identified by the supported commander. The
TPFDD identifies forces that supporting commanders must provide to successfully
implement the plan. These force capabilities are represented by Unit Type Codes, a five
letter alphanumeric code that contains a mission description and the resources required to
accomplish that mission. Additionally, the TPFDD identifies which units will provide
the required forces and the timeline that must be followed. The TPFDD is a living
document that is refined continually during the planning process. (see Figure 1)

Figure 1- Deliberate Planning Process (LRO Log Plans Course, 2003:21)
Once the resources required to support a plan are determined, transportation
feasibility is assessed to identify constraints which may affect the plan. After a plan is
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determined to be transportable, supporting commanders identify limitations, to be either
resolved by utilizing resources from another supporting commander, or identified as
shortfalls, which will be reported to the JCS. Once the limitations have been resolved,
the plan is submitted to the JCS for final review.
The two most frequent outputs of the Deliberate Planning process are Operations
Plans (Oplans) and Concept Plans (ConPlans). Oplans are plans that direct the conduct
of military operations. They contain a complete listing of supporting plans and
appendices, and also have a supporting Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)
listing. Oplans are more specific and detailed than ConPlans.
A ConPlan contains fully developed statements of mission, situation,
assumptions, and concepts of operations. ConPlans tend to contain well defined
statements of mission, situation, assumptions, and concepts of operations. However, they
usually do not contain detailed support requirements or detailed flow of resources.
The goal of Deliberate Planning is to identify resources required to accomplish
our National Strategic Objective, and to hasten response planning when actual
contingencies arise. However, it is important to note that in Deliberate Planning, time is
not a restrictive factor, and most plans are developed in 18 to 24 months.
Crisis Action Planning
Crisis Action Planning occurs when military intervention is required due to an
emerging crisis. A crisis is defined in Joint Pub 5-03.1 as
“an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States’ vital interests that
develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or
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military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated
to achieve national objectives.” (Joint Pub 5-03.1, 1997:21)

Crisis Action Planning occurs when a situation arises that requires immediate
military intervention. During the initial stages of the plan, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) assesses the situation. The CJCS then discusses the situation with
the National Security Council (NSC), which is composed of the President, the Vice
President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Together they decide
whether or not military intervention may be required, and in what capacity it would be
used.
Once the CJCS and NSC identify potential courses of action (COAs) that require
analysis, the CJCS issues a Warning Order that contains a description of the threat and
the potential COAs. The resources and requirements of each COA are then assessed.
Due to time restrictions, this assessment may not entail the development of complete
TPFDDs and transportation feasibility studies of actual resource requirements. The
supported commander consolidates inputs from all of the involved agencies and
determines the best course of action. The consolidated plan is submitted to the NSC for
review, and becomes executable when the NSC issues an Execution Order.
The nature of Crisis Action Planning is a response posture. In contrast with
Deliberate Planning, time is a critical factor in Crisis Action Planning. In response to
unexpected contingencies, multiple courses of action must be developed and analyzed
within hours or days. This need for accurate planning within a small timeframe requires
accurate tools to rapidly estimate deployment support requirements in a short amount of
time.
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Joint Planning Process
As contingencies arise, they may or may not have been anticipated or planned for.
Thus, during the development of potential courses of action, a suitable deliberate plan
may or may not be present. The result is a requirement to have a consolidated joint
planning process that allows for planning to occur either by modifying a Deliberate Plan
or by creating a new plan through Crisis Action Planning.
Figure 2 shows the consolidated planning process that the Department of
Defenses uses during contingency response.

Figure 2. Joint Planning Process (AFMAN 10-403, 2003:9)
Figure 2 details the relationship between Crisis Action Planning and Deliberate
Planning. Oplans and ConPlans, if available, developed in the Deliberate Planning
process are expanded or modified to generate particular courses of action. If no Oplans
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or ConPlans exist in relation to the crisis, then Crisis Action Planning occurs to generate
courses of action. In either case, once the proper course of action has been selected, an
Execution Order is issued.
An important system that serves as an enabler for the entire planning and
execution system is the Joint Operating Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
“JOPES is a combination of joint policies and procedures (guidance), and Automated
Data Procedures (ADP) support used to plan and execute joint military operations (User’s
Guide, 1995:3).” According to the User’s Guide for JOPES (1995), the system
standardizes the terminology and operating procedures used by each service into one
standard multifaceted system. JOPES is used in both Deliberate and Crisis Action
Planning processes to ensure that service capabilities and requirements are all accounted
for in a standardized fashion. This effort integrates each service’s efforts into a single
system used to execute multi-Service exercises and operations.
In addition, JOPES serves as an Automated Data Processing tool. It supports the
planning process by integrating a network of systems that enable planners to estimate
potential deployment requirements based on Unit Type Code (UTC) taskings, to track
items during the duration of the deployment and to manage redeployment operations as
well. According to the JOPES User’s Guide,
“JOPES uses a set of command and control techniques and processes, supported by a
computerized information system, to ensure the right amount of timely support gets to the
war fighter to ensure a decisive victory (User’s Guide; 1995:3).”

The UTCs contained in JOPES are not tailored. That is, they contain the largest
resource level that could possibly be developed to support a deployment. Thus when the
planning factors are identified during the construction of COAs, planners tend to
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overstate the movement requirement. This presents a skewed transportation feasibility
analysis.
Air Force Planning
As Joint Planning directives move down the chain of command, the Air Force
implements its own specific planning process in order to fulfill supported commander
requirements. This section begins with the Air Force Planning Process. This is the
process that the Air Force uses to translate Joint Planning Process output into a plan that
is service-specific.
Air Force Planning Process
The Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP) is the tool used to translate
JSCP requirements into Air Force plans and capabilities. The WMP is composed of five
volumes (Logistics’ Readiness Officer Course, 2003:26).
The first WMP volume provides planners with general policies and guidance for
the development of war plans and the support of combat forces during wartime. This
section addresses the nature of the mission, the concept of operations, and execution
tasks for Air Forces throughout the world.
The second volume identifies all of the joint plans which require Air Force
participation. This serves as a master listing of all possible taskings that the Air Force
could receive in the bodies of existing plans.
The third volume serves as a master listing of all Unit Type Codes (UTCs) and
their associated Mission Capability Statements (MISCAPs). All of the UTCs listed in the
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MEFPAK are also listed in this chapter. This provides planners with an accessible listing
of options that can be used when developing new plans or reviewing existing plans.
The fourth volume of the WMP details the current state of MAJCOM planning,
positioning, and employment activity of aviation forces tasked in support of Oplans. This
provides a picture the current location of forces, and what missions they are serving.
The fifth volume provides wartime sortie and attrition rates and sortie duration for
each type of aircraft and potential mission. Additionally, it provides consumption rates
for items such as fuel, oil, lubricants, rations and other mission critical logistics support.
The WMP provides planners with visibility of the planning process, the current
resources available to the Air Force, the taskings that currently engage our forces, and the
amount of support required to sustain operations for a given period of time. This
information plays an important part in enabling the Air Force to provide planning in
accordance with JOPES procedures and JSCP requirements.
Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging System
According to Air Force Manual 10-401 the MEFPAK “is the process for
developing and describing standard, predefined manpower and equipment force packages
and determining the deployment characteristics of these packages in support of JOPES”
(AFMAN 10-401, 2003: 93).
The MEFPAK was designed to provide planners with standardized descriptions of
unit capabilities. These descriptions facilitate the deliberate and crisis action planning
processes by blending the capability of a unit’s resources with a plan requirement. Force
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capability packages are identified in MEFPAK using unit type codes (UTCs). The terms
force package and UTC are often used synonymously.
UTCs are comprised of two major components. The first is called the Manpower
Force Packaging System (MANFOR). This contains a listing of all of the personnel
required to satisfy the force capability. The second major component of a UTC is the
Logistics Force Packaging System (LOGFOR). This is a listing of all of the equipment
required to successfully support a given force capability. While some UTCs do not have
associated MANFOR or LOGFOR components, all UTCs are a blend of resources
required to provide a specified force capability. They are registered in the MEFPAK
listing and become a standard component for use in Air Force planning.
F-15E MEFPAK Descriptions
The MEFPAK provides a listing of all deployable UTCs owned by the Air Force.
This listing shows that planners deploy Air Force F-15E aircraft using a three-increment
methodology. In addition to the core F-15E packages, other UTCs are often tasked as
supporting UTCs.
The first increment of an F-15E deployment is a 12 ship UTC (3FQL1 or 3FQM1
depending on the engine type). This package provides 12 deploying F-15E aircraft, and
the associated standard support UTCs required to support them.
Since aircraft requirements are not linear in nature, an initial follow-on 6 ship
(3FQL2 or 3FQM2) is used, along with additional standard support UTCs. This package
contains the resources that must be added to support six additional aircraft, creating a
package of 18, versus 12 aircraft. Since, some required support for the initial follow-on
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6-ship is contained in the 12-ship support UTCs, resulting in a package that is
proportionally smaller than the initial 12-ship package.
Finally, a second follow-on 6 ship package (3FQL3 of 3FQM3) and associated
support is designed to raise the force numbers from 18 to 24 ships. This package
contains mostly pilots and crews, since there is very little additional support equipment
required.
Many of the supporting UTCs are standard, identified as such in volume 3 of the
WMP. Standard support packages include the maintenance and support necessary for
sustaining operations. However, many support UTCs are not standard. Non-standard
support UTCs are added to a package based on local factors (i.e. the experience of the
planner or unique mission needs). The size and number of UTCs selected to deploy
varies depending on the size and nature of the deployment (Snyder and Mills, 2004:6).
Expeditionary Air Forces (EAF)
During the Cold War, the USAF was “primarily poised to respond to conflict in
the most volatile arenas of the time: Europe or the Korean Peninsula “(Galway et al,
2001:7). With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, a change in readiness was required.
Planning became focused on rapid deployments with global reach, enabling forces to
respond to emerging threats and smaller conflicts (Vo, 1997:12). This led to the creation
of the Expeditionary Air Forces in 1994.
The EAF “concept is how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains itself by
creating a mindset and cultural state that embraces the unique characteristics of aerospace
power – range, speed, flexibility, and precision – to meet the national security challenges
of the 21st Century. The concept has two fundamental principles: first, to provide trained
and ready aerospace forces for national defense, and second, to meet national
commitments.” (AFI 10-400, 2002:6)
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The EAF represents the entire Air Force inventory, and is divided into ten Air
Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). AEFs contain “Fighter, Bomber, Airlift, Tanker,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance units (that) are on-call or deployed for
one
4-month rotation during each 20-month cycle” (AEF Course, 2003) (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. An Example AEF Cycle- Cycle 5 (AEF Course, 2003)
Each rotation is composed of two AEFs, postured to deploy to two separate
locations in support of the NSAs multi-theatre war doctrine. One cycle is composed of a
20 months period where all AEFs have been postured to deploy.
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Since the AEF is a response mechanism with a long planning horizon (typically
14-months), it lies somewhere between Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning. Like the
Deliberate Planning Process, AEF planning has a long planning horizon, but is used to
respond to a contingency without the revisions common to the Joint Planning Process.
Additionally, the long lead time results in a higher level of airlift planning. By enabling
airlift to be programmed far in advance, it has a higher probability of receiving airlift
support.
UTC Tailoring in the Joint Planning Process
UTCs are generic packages designed to represent the maximum package size
required to support a given force capability. Resources are often trimmed from the
package to meet the needs of the mission at hand. This activity is known as tailoring.
Tailoring cannot begin until UTCs have been selected based on operational
requirements. However, equipment and personnel cannot be prepared for deployment
until unit planners have tailored their UTCs, and in cooperation with MAJCOM and
USTRANSCOM, acquired sufficient transportation to mobilize their package.
During the execution phase of the Joint Planning Process, multiple possible
Courses of Action (COAs) are developed. Within each COA, force capabilities required
to successfully achieve the goals (established by the NSC) are identified in terms of
untailored UTCs. Each plan is then evaluated for force strength and transportation
feasibility. Once feasibility has been ascertained for each plan, a favorable plan is
selected to begin implementation.
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After a plan is selected, a TPFDD is created in JOPES. This TPFDD identifies
not only the force capabilities required, but the units tasked to supply those capabilities.
Unit planners work with Major Command (MAJCOM) planners to garner information
regarding the nature of the scenario. This information is used to determine which
equipment or personnel contained in the UTC are actually needed to accomplish the
mission. Once this is accomplished, unit level planners determine feasibility of their
plan. If sufficient resources are available, they notify MAJCOM planners who source
transportation through United States Transportation Command (HQ USTRANSCOM).
HQ USTRANSCOM sources airlift using the tailored deployment data developed
by the units, and coordinated through the MAJCOMs. If insufficient airlift is available,
TRANSCOM notifies the MAJCOM that further tailoring is required. This iterative
process occurs until airlift is sourced for the deploying unit. This process occurs late in
the planning window, close to the point of execution.
During most deployment scenarios, the force capability provided within a
UTC contains resources not required to accomplish the mission at hand. In these
cases, resources are removed (tailored) from the package. If the support provided
by the UTC closely matches the resources required by the scenario, then tailoring
may be minimal, or not required.
However, if the tasking is “non-standard” (for example: fewer aircraft or people in to an
unplanned environment/location, or in an otherwise constrained situation that doesn’t
already exist in a Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN), tailoring becomes a major workload
requiring a significant increase in validation, coordination, and computer input activities.
Again, numerous hours can be spent in refining the logistics and manpower files.
(Leftwich et al., 1997:17-21).

During Crisis Action Planning, these additional planning hours are
precious when a scenario emerges requiring mobilization within 48 hours. The
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importance of rapid estimations during execution becomes magnified because
mobility operations cannot begin until tailoring is completed. Additionally, “the
amount of airlift available is relatively constant (and very limited), so the size of
the deployment package determines how many units can be moved at once”
(Griffis and Martin, 1996:9). As a result, plans using a full-UTC planning factor
overestimate the required airlift. A plan may be dismissed as unfeasible if HQ
USTRANSCOM or Air Mobility Command determine that there is insufficient
airlift to move the appropriate units in a timely manner.
“An analytical methodology to shorten this time frame would…expedite
crisis action planning, reducing the response time to exigencies” (Snyder and
Mills, 2004:2). By creating a rapid estimation tool, different potential COAs can
be quickly analyzed for feasibility, reducing the time required for planning and
increasing the time allowed for execution.
An estimation tool could also improve the Deliberate Planning Process.
Precise resource forecasts during Deliberate Planning would create more accurate
TPFDDs. If a crisis emerged requiring activation of an Oplan, an accurate
TPFDD would reduce the time required to modify the existing plan into an
actionable plan. Snyder concurs with the notion that a planning estimator can
enhance the Deliberate Planning Process.
“operational planners could explore candidate deployment plans to estimate the
manpower and material needed across all deployment sites. A comparison might be used
to dismiss one plan in favor of another based on logistical efficiencies” (Snyder and
Mills, 2004:41).
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Since transportation feasibility assessments are negatively impacted by full-UTC
estimations, a tool that could more accurately predict resource requirements would
improve the ability to rapidly plan effective responses. By predicting resource
requirements early in the process, feasible COAs and airlift requirements could be
developed at USTRANSCOM before TPFDD data were sent to the MAJCOMs and to the
affected bases. This would allow more time for airlift sourcing by ensuring that early
iterations of the TPFDD accurately estimate the package after tailoring occurs at the
MAJCOM and the base.

Relevant Variables in UTC Tailoring
UTCs are resource listings that include the maximum amount of resources
required to support a given package. However, there are many factors that may reduce
the logistics resources required to support a mission. This creates dissonance between
the resources required to support a mission and the resources contained within the
untailored UTCs. This dissonance creates the need for tailoring, and guides the
composition of the final deployment package.
One critical factor that results in tailoring is the availability of airlift. Even as the
Air Force has transitioned to a unit with an expeditionary mission, numerous studies have
indicated that there may be insufficient airlift available to meet mobility requirements
(e.g., Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001:8; General Accounting Office Report, 2000:5).
The shortage of airlift requires that deploying units tailor their UTCs. Indeed, it can be
argued that with unconstrained airlift capacity, tailoring UTCs would be unnecessary.
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A second factor that impacts the size of a deploying UTC is the characteristics of
the destination base. Since UTCs are generic packages and are established as the
maximum required supporting a wartime capability, it is assumed that there are no
resources available at the deployed location. However, a wide range of availability of
lodging, sustenance, infrastructure, supplies and vehicles may be available, either through
pre-positioning or through local businesses (Snyder and Mills, 2004: xviii). The
availability of resources at the deployed location determines which resources can be left
out of the deployment package.
The third variable that impacts the size of the deployment package is the number
of aircraft that are scheduled to deploy (Snyder and Mills, 2004:10). As previously
described, the Air Force deploys F-15E model aircraft using a series of three UTCs. The
first provides support for a 12 ship package. The second provides additional resources
required to support 18 ships. The final provides the additional resources required to
support 24 ships. However, F-15Es are often deployed in quantities other than 12, 18 or
24 ships. When the Air Force decides to deploy F-15Es in other quantities, tailoring
must occur. The result may be a significant modification of untailored UTCs to derive the
actual deployment package.
The fourth variable that may result in UTC tailoring is whether the receiving base
will serve as a composite location. A composite location is “an Air Force Wing with
several different types of aircraft assigned to the same base.” (O’Fearna, 1999:12). If
multiple aircraft types are assigned to a deployed location, a reduction in resources may
be available by eliminating redundancy. This has been identified as a significant
footprint reduction strategy (O’Fearna, 1999:11).
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The duration of the deployment is a fifth variable that can affect deployment
resource requirements. Initial Preplanned Supply Kits, estimated fuel support and
hospital kit requirements are built to provide a 30 day supply (Logistic’s Readiness
Officer’s Supply Module, 2002:27). However, planners may reduce these requirements
if services are available locally, or other plans can lessen the need for airlift (Galway et
al, 2002: 17).
Individual experiences of deployment planners also can effect the UTC selection
and tailoring process. “Which UTCs are deployed will vary somewhat depending on the
judgment of the planner” (Snyder and Mills, 2004:13). Thus, variation may occur even
in deployments under near-identical circumstances. In this regard, a stochastic model
will likely be required to properly estimate potential deployment sizes since it captures
the variance associated with deployment data.
The availability of prepositioned assets that are deployed from a third location is
another important variable in determining final package size, as well. The first source of
assets deployed from a third location is assets from War Readiness Materials (WRM)
stocks. According to Air Force Instruction 25-101:
“WRM is Service-owned resources positioned as either starter or swing stock, or a
combination of both, to maximize worldwide war fighting capability…Starter stocks are
those assets required at or near the point of intended use until air and sea lines of
communications (LOCs) are capable of sustaining operations…The AF prepositions to
support starter requirements. Swing stocks are positioned to maximize flexibility to support
multiple theaters… WRM is based on wartime additive requirements sufficient
to accomplish the Two-MTW (Multi-Theatre War) strategy” (AFI 25-101, 2000:15).

Thus, WRM, as defined, are materials that are available for deployment to the
deployed location. These assets are not required to be shipped from the deploying
locations and reduce the size of the deployment package.
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A second type of asset available from a third location is MAJCOM supporting
resources. Bare-base support kits are often available at the MAJCOM level to provide
support. Harvest Falcon and Harvest Eagle kits are examples of MAJCOM support
resource. Harvest Falcon and Harvest Eagle kit provide billeting, kitchen, hygiene
facilities, industrial operations and flight line support for units deploying to a base that
provides little or no support (Snyder and Mills; 2004:25). This reduces the number of
resources that the deploying base must provide to be self-sufficient.
The third type of third location support is resources that are available from a unit
in another wing. In the AEF construct, support and operations resources are sometimes
deployed from different bases. Since the deploying unit is the base supplying the aircraft,
their required resources to support their flying operations are reduced. This occurs
during many AEF rotations. An example is the AEF support given by RAF Lakenheath,
an F-15 fighter wing. At Lakenheath, the F-15s are tasked to support AEFs 4 and 7 (see
Appendix 1). However, support forces are provided in other AEFs. The result is that
some support functions deploying from Lakenheath do not deploy to support the
Lakenheath F-15s, but rather support operational activities initiating from other bases.
Additionally, when the F-15s deploy from Lakenheath, units deploy from other locations
to provide certain types and levels of support. The end result is and understanding that
there are variables that affect the quantity of support deploying from a base to support a
given mission.
Automated Resource Estimation Tools
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As the Air Force transitioned to an expeditionary force, focus on the ability to
rapidly respond to crises intensified. The expeditionary mindset requires a faster and
more streamlined planning process to enable sufficient force identification in short
planning horizons (Snyder and Mills, 2004:XV).
Air Combat Command (ACC) establishes the planning horizon for crisis response
as “48 hours from execute order to full deployment and full operation, after a 24-hour
strategic warning” (Tripp et al., 1998:5). The resulting planning window established by
ACC is a total of 72 hours from the time of the emergence of the crisis, to the time of
response. The need for faster, more efficient logistics support of combat operations is
described as Agile Combat Support or ACS (Galway et al., 2002:iii). Numerous tools
have been developed to estimate the deployment forces required to support a given
deployment scenario.

UTC-Development Tool (UTC-DT)
The UTC-DT is a tool that is intended to increase the efficiency of Air Force
mobility operations.
“UTC-DT will improve the development and tailoring process currently employed by the
Air Force by quickly providing recommendations for cargo and personnel, and allowing
multiple users at different levels the ability to work together in refining the detail to best
fit the mission requirements.” (Leftwich et al, 1997:25)

UTC-DT is a decision tool model that recommends types and numbers of support
equipment using rule-sets that have been developed from allowance standards and
interviews with actual combat units (Goddard, 2001:35). These rule-sets are the
recorded, quantified recommendations of field experts as discovered by several hundred
interviews conducted by UTC-DT authors at Cannon AFB and Mountain Home AFB
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(Goddard, 2001: 36). These decision rules correlate the level of support with the number
of aircraft that are tasked to deploy.
Information regarding personnel (from MANPER-B) and equipment (from
LOGMOD-B) requirements are consolidated and enter the UTC-DT system. The system
is also consolidated with information from the Beddown Capability Assessment Tool
(BCAT). The BCAT provides automated details of the resources available at the
deployed location. The detail of WRM availability is also consolidated within the UTCDT database. The rule-sets are then modified by subtracting the resources available at
the deployed location (BCAT) and the assets available from WRM. (see Figure 4)
IDS

LOGMOD-B

MANPER-B

DeMS

LOGCAT Data Warehouse
UTC-DT
Rule Base
BCAT
Assessments

WRM
UTC-DT

Site
Capabilities
Database

UTC-DT
Recommendation
Database

LOGCAT
Agent

Figure 4. UTC-DT Proposed Connectivity (Sjoquist, 1997:18)
The UTC-DT user inputs required information into the model such as date,
Mission Designation Series, number of aircraft, sortie rate, mission type, duration of
deployment and other items.
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The output of the UTC-DT is a tailored list of equipment and personnel needed to
support a deployment under the circumstances described by the user. This output is
stored by UTC-DT as the equipment detail of the specific existing or created UTC.
There are key assumptions that may limit the applicability of the UTC-DT model
as a significant planning tool. Since much of the planning process is based on personal
experiences, different planners from different places may produce a variety of listings of
required resources. Since the UTC-DT rule-sets are based on the inputs from planners
from Cannon AFB and Mountain Home AFB, they are derived from a limited set of
philosophies and experiences. The sets may not generalize to other planners or to other
bases.
A second weakness of the model is its precision. The UTC-DT provides a
deterministic list of resources, leaving no flexibility for situations where commanders
may opt to take non-traditional equipment.
A third weakness is the reliance on BCAT data regarding base support. The data
in the BCAT is often inadequate and out of date (Leftwich et al, 1997:39). Additionally,
much of the problem with determining base support “lies in the stochastic nature of the
quantities and availabilities of the many resources required to support air mobility
operations” (Randall, 2004:16).
The reliance upon input from BCAT and WRM systems significantly reduces it
usefulness in Deliberate Planning. Deliberate Planning usually occurs in absence of
detail regarding deployed location and theatre of operations. The lack of knowledge
about the future location of military operations requires a model that is flexible,
providing a range of potential resource requirements.

27

A fourth weakness associated with the UTC-DT model is that it includes only
maintenance packages that are directly associated with the F-15E UTC. Logistics and
support functions not directly associated with maintenance activities were not included in
the resource determination. UTC-DT does not account for these resources.
RAND/AFLMA Requirements Determination Tools.
The RAND Corporation and the Air Force Logistics Management Agency
(AFLMA) teamed to create a different model for estimating resource requirements. Their
efforts focused on the relationship between the areas that require and provide logistics
support: Forward Operating Locations (FOL), Forward Support Locations (FSL), and
CONUS Support Locations (CSL).
The ability to support a deployment requires optimal use of each potential source
of support. (Galway et al., 1999:38). Additionally, in order to optimize the mobility
process, three crucial determinations must be made (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Three-Step RAND Approach (Galway et al, 1999:36)
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The initial step is to identify the requirements of the mission. This provides the
nature of the deployment. Once this has been decided, planners must identify the support
required to satisfy the mission requirements. Third, trade-offs and resource-reducing
opportunities must be addressed.
The deployment of aircraft falls within the second phase. Specifically, it is during
the initial support requirements determination that mobility package size is identified.
RAND and AFLMA have captured their decision rule sets within EXCEL spreadsheets,
which allow for rapid resource determinations for five resource categories: “munitions,
fuels support, unit maintenance equipment (the bulk of unit support equipment), vehicles,
and shelter” (Galway et al., 1999:5).
The models for the other aircraft operate in a similar manner to the F-15E model,
but will not be examined, as they are outside the scope of this research. Since the scope
of this research is to investigate the resources required to support F-15E deployments, it
is necessary to analyze the RAND/AFLMA Minmxf15e requirements determination
model.
The Minmxf15e is an optimization model geared at minimizing the resources
required to deploy in support of an F15E deployment.
The minimum maintenance personnel and support equipment model (an EXCEL
spreadsheet) determines requirements for the primary maintenance activities described
above. The model determines aviation support package requirements by deriving
maintenance personnel and equipment capabilities from the number of Primary Assigned
Aircraft (PAA) tasked for deployment and other important parameters. (Tripp et al.,
1999:89)

One of the key assumptions is that the deployed units are tasked for a “seven-day
operation in a highly tasked environment” (Tripp et al., 1999:92). Additionally, it
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focuses solely on the number of aircraft to derive the resources required to support the
package. (Tripp et al., 1999:95).
The rule sets that establish the base of the model were developed mostly through
“discussion with experts in the field. Unit-, MAJCOM-, and USAF-level functional
experts have validated our rules and models” (Tripp et al., 1999:92). There may be
issues with the validity of these rule-sets, since there was no effort to ensure that the
experiences, knowledge and capability were representative of other deployment planners.
Thus the rule-sets may not be generalizable.
Table 1 shows a portion of data for Air Ground Equipment (AGE) equipment
from the model and the accompanying rule-sets for each item (Tripp et al., 1999:97).
Thus, resources are selected to deploy based on the number of aircraft required for the
mission. For example, two TTU-228 hydraulic test stands will be deployed to support 12
F-15E’s. That number would remain unless 24 aircraft were deployed, in which case,
four would be deployed. This is representative of the other rule-set procedures discussed
in this chapter.
Table 1. Rule Sets Employed by Minmxf15e Model
Nomenclature
TTU-228
MHU-83
M32A-86D
MEP-105
Data Pod
Trailer
MHU-110
Engine Trailer

Description
Hydraulic Test Stand, 3 Phase,
5000 PSIG, 15 GPM
Munitions Lift Truck
Generator, 3 Phase, 115/200V
or 230/400V, 400Hz
Generator

Rule-Base
2 per 12 Acft, 4 per 24
2 per 12 Acft, 4 per 24
2 per 12 Acft
Req. 5 for Avionics support
Req. for GBU-15 capability
Included with MunMaster input
1 per 12 Acft, plus 1 for ESTA

30

The model also initially included other resource characteristics, such as the
number of short tons of AGE equipment required, and was later modified to include
weight and dimensions of all associated cargo (Goddard, 2001:38).
There are a few potential weaknesses in this model as well. First, it only
considers the number of deploying aircraft. Since it ignores the potentially significant
factors that were previously discussed, such as third location capabilities, its applicability
may be limited.
Similar to the UTC-DT model, the Minmxf153 model considers only associated
UTCs, and may miss required UTCs that are not listed in the AFWUS. Finally, its
product is a deterministic listing of resources, providing no flexibility for different
planning philosophies.
Airlift Footprint Estimator (AFE)
A joint venture between the Air Force Institute of Technology and the Air Force
Research Laboratory was initiated to develop the Advanced Logistics Project.

A key

component of this project was the Mission-Resource Value Assessment Tool (M-R
VAT); a tool designed to utilize rule-sets for calculation of the needed support equipment
to sustain an optimal force mix for the required time frame. This tool was intended to
validate the rule-sets created by the RAND model.
The goal of this project was to produce a tool to automatically build custom
UTCs. Rather than tailor current UTCs, the M-R VAT used valid rule-sets to build, from
the ground up, the proper list of needed equipment and spare parts to sustain any
conceived optimal force package (Goddard, 2001:12). The research conducted by
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Goddard had two stated goals: identify an airlift footprint estimation function and justify
existing rule-sets for use in the M-R VAT tool (Goddard, 2001:13).
In order to develop an airlift footprint estimate, the data from actual deployments
of F-16 aircraft was collected. A best fit line was calculated through linear regression to
demonstrate the relationship between the number of aircraft deploying and the number of
tons of equipment deployed.
The final estimation model proposed by Goddard (2001) was:
y =7.6x + 48.1

where

(1)

y = required short tons
x = number of deployed F-16 aircraft

Once this equation, called the Airlift Footprint Estimator (AFE), was developed,
it was used as a baseline to compare the performance of the decision rule sets used by the
UTC-DT and the RAND/AFLMA Minmxf16cj model.
The resulting evaluation of the AFE validation was that the rule sets in both the
UTC-DT and the Minmaxf16cj should be implemented within the M-R VAT tool
(Goddard, 2001:74). That is their combined output was more successful in determining
the final output of actual deployment requirement. However, the model failed to
combine the rule-sets to ensure that the models were not tasking redundant resources.
This lack of information limits the applicability of the research conclusion.
There are a number of limitations regarding the validity of the AFE and its use as
a basis for verifying rule-sets. The first is that it only uses one predictor; the number of
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aircraft. Since numerous factors were identified in the literature, an enumeration of the
percentage of explained variance would determine the strength of the model.
Additionally, the model was not tested for the assumptions of regression, and R-squared
value was provided.
Another potential limitation of the study is the exclusion of a statistical model to
estimate personnel requirements. This is significant for planning purposes, since
personnel consume 30% of the airlift required during deployments (Galway et al.,
1999:5).

RAND’s Strategic Tool for the Analysis of Required Transportation (START)
In 2004, the RAND Corporation published the new START resource estimator.
This effort attempted to implement the military’s direction to Capability Based Planning
(CBP). CBP is a transformation initiative, directed by then Secretary of the Air Force,
Donald Rumsfeld (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001). The new approach to planning
is to create a “portfolio of capabilities that is robust across the spectrum of possible force
requirements, both functional and geographical (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001:17).
This new way of planning will “require the United States military to develop a new
analytic architecture” (Snyder and Mills, 2004:2).
The START model determines the feasibility of a list of UTCs required to support
a given deployment and estimates the movement requirements. Similar to previous
models, START tailors UTCs using decision rules developed through interviews with
functional experts and through Air Force Publication information. Actual deployment
data was not considered.
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“We have not used historical deployment data as a significant input for three reasons.
First, for most deployed sites, the nature and quantity of existing infrastructure,
manpower, and equipment at the site are poorly documented. Because these resources
are needed, yet are not on the TPFDD, the TPFDD underestimates the requirements.
Likewise, some material is not at the site and also not listed on the TPFDD, because it
was readily available locally (for example, leasing of general-purpose vehicles). Second,
a large fraction of deployed UTCs are listed in the TPFDD as “**Z99” and, as such,
contain insufficient detail for our needs. Third, in historical deployments, the desired
operational capability of a site may change with time, making it difficult to correlate a
specific capability with material on the TPFDD.” (Snyder and Mills 2004:12)

The model addressed inadequate BCAT information by designating the deployed
location as either a bare-base or a non-bare base. While the authors concede that these
terms are loosely defined, given the lack of current base information, topography, and
geography, an estimation is required (Snyder and Mills 2004:6).
The model input screen allows for parameters to be entered into the system
including base description (Bare or Established), operating requirement (Initial or Full),
and a variety of potentially important support factors (see Figure 6)

Figure 6. START Model Input Screen
Given a set of input parameters, START automatically compiles a listing of UTCs
resembling a TPFDD. (see Table 2)
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Table 2. Abbreviated START Output – 24-Ship Tasked to Established Base
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UL
N
DESCRIPTION
24 F 15E -220
PB FL SP THREAT RESP LIT TM
PB FL SP THREAT RESP AUG TM
PB FL SP THREAT RESP AUG TM
PB FL SP THREAT RESP AUG TM
PRIME BEEF EOD LEAD TEAM
PRIME BEEF EOD FOLLOW TEAM
PRIME BEEF EOD BASE SUPT TM
24 F 15E
SECURITY FORCES SQUAD
SECURITY FORCES SQUAD
SECURITY FORCES SQUAD

UTC
3FQK1
4F9DB
4F9DC
4F9DC
4F9DC
4F9X1
4F9X2
4F9X3
HGHQ1
QFEB2
QFEB2
QFEB2

UNIT
NAME

PAX
509
2
2
2
2
6
4
2
70
13
13
13

AUTH
PAX
509
2
2
2
2
6
4
2
70
13
13
13

TOTAL WT
390.6
6.4
0
0
0
11.8
5.9
3.6
159.3
5.3
5.3
5.3

Essentially, the model selects the proper UTCs given a certain set of deployment
parameters. This listing is compiled using standard UTCs adopted directly from the
MEFPAK. Additionally, the tool allows for planning many combinations of fighter,
cargo, special operations and reconnaissance airframes at a given location. In fact by
combining options for the base, mission and airframes involved in the tasking, the
START model provides an excellent tool for UTC identification, allowing for rapid
construction of the TPFDD.
However, the model considers UTCs whole, that is, it does not assist in tailoring
UTCs. While this can assist in rapidly developing the TPFDD during mobility
operations, it does not solve the problems encountered in the process.
First, it calculates only standard UTCs. During mobility operations, UTC
selection is an inexact endeavor. That is, many different UTCs may be selected to satisfy
a resource requirement. For example, if four Vehicle Operators, Air Force Specialty
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Code (AFSC 2T1XX) are needed for support, then numerous UTCs can be combined or
tailored to meet this need. Table 3 shows the UTCs that contain 2T1XX personnel.
Table 3. UTCs Containing 2T1XX Personnel (Vehicle Operators)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UTC
UFTSA
UFTSB
UFTSE
UFTSK
UFTSL
UFTSM

UNI
T
TRN
TRN
TRN
TRN
TRN
TRN

TYPE NAME
BASE SUPPORT PKG RF
WG TRANSPORTATION ELE
VEHICLE OPERATIONS MANAGER
VEHICLE OPS SUPPORT PKG
VEHICLE OPS SUPERVISOR
VEHICLE OPS SUPERINTENDENT

AUTH
PERS
33
17
1
5
1
1

NO.
PAX
33
17
1
5
1
1

No.
2T1XX
9
5
1
5
1
1

As can be seen in Table 3, four 2T1XXs could be tasked by tailoring UFTSA,
UFTSB, or UFTSK. Additionally, they could be tasked by combining UFTSE, UFTSL
or UFTSM. Thus, the selection of the UTC is not as important as defining the actual
requirement for the deployment. In reality, it is the identification of resource
requirements that consumes the majority of planning time, which the START model does
not do.
Another issue with the applicability of the START model is that it only tasks
aircraft packages at full-UTC levels. (see Figure 7)
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Figure 7. START Aircraft Selection Tab
As is shown in Figure 7, F-15Es can only be tasked in increments of 6. This does
not allow for planning deployments that are in increments other than 6.
Additionally, when viewing the composition of a 6-ship tasking, it selects the
UTC 3FQKR, which is a six ship tasking that no longer exists. It was deleted during the
transitioned to the current, right-sized UTCs previously described.
Upon examination it was discovered that the MEFPAK used by the START
model was published in December of 2001. Additionally, attempts to update the model
with a current AFWUS were unsuccessful. This is probably because the EXCEL
MACROS were designed specifically using the MEFPAK used to develop the model. As
a result, the model would have to be updated each time a new MEFPAK is published, and

37

the MACROs would have to be calibrated to the new data set. Failure to update as
needed would result in the model tasking invalid or non-existent UTCs.
The START model provides the foundation for a rapid UTC selection tool that
could be used to rapidly develop a TPFDD. However, it is not a tool that could rapidly
determine resource requirements and it could not forecast deployment resource
requirements.
Summary
With a basic understanding of the military’s Joint Planning Process, and the tools
used to mobilize our forces, it is apparent that a tool to estimate resource requirements
can increase the speed and accuracy in which we respond to arising crises. Additionally,
flexibility and the ability to compare, evaluate and select multiple scenarios will improve
the quality of plans that we use to go to war. Chapter III provides a description of the
approach used to create a stochastic resource estimator, based on historical deployment
scenarios. It also provides a methodology for analyzing the ability to predict resource
requirements, and to determine the accuracy of those predictions.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the basis for creating an explanatory
model of resources used to support an F-15E deployment, and its use as a forecasting tool
for improving transportation feasibility analysis. First, a justification for using a
regression model will be provided. Second, the specific factors to be used in the
construction of the model will be discussed, including their expected effect on the
dependent variables. Third, a detailed explanation will characterize the process of
constructing the model, including the process of checking for the underlying assumptions
of a regression model. Finally, a detailed explanation of methodology used to test the
validity and the accuracy of the model will be provided.
Model Selection
This research design calls for a quantified relationship between several
independent variables and a dependent variable. A regression model accomplished this
by quantifying the deterministic portion of a data set, and providing an interval of
allowable error (McClave et al, 2001:458). Additionally, since it is assumed that
deployment planning has an error component involved, the ability to include a prediction
interval provides a better estimate than deterministic models.
Regression models attempt to fit a straight line through a data set, minimizing the
cumulative distance between the line and each data point (called a residual). This is
accomplished by analyzing the variance in the dependent variable related to each
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independent variable. The amount of error that occurs that cannot be explained by the
independent variable, are considered to be random error.
In this model, a best fit line will be fit through the data set, based on significant
variables. This best fit line with a corresponding confidence interval will serve as a tool
to define the explanatory power of the model. Additionally, if the model successfully
explains a large amount of the variance, a prediction interval can be used to forecast
resource requirements of future deployments, given certain parameters.
Factor selection
There are numerous variables that can impact the number of resources required to
support an F-15E deployment. These factors can increase or decrease the number of
resources required to deploy, which requires that a robust model identify and account for
them.
The first factor used in the construction of an estimation tool is the number of
aircraft that are scheduled to deploy. Since F-15s can deploy in varying numbers, it is
important to relate the size of the package to the number of aircraft that it is required to
support. It is anticipated that the coefficient of this variable will be positive, as each
adding aircraft will increase the required support. This variable will be quantified using
whole number integers corresponding to the number of aircraft.
The presence of other airframes at the deployed location has been identified as a
potential factor. Collocating different airframes at a single location, called composite
basing, reduces the amount of resources required to support operations (O’Fearna
1999:11). As a result, base level planners will collaborate to determine which UTC
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package will contain shared resources, and which UTC will have resources tailored out.
A dummy variable is used to capture this phenomenon, where zero indicates that there
are no other airframes present, and a one indicates composite basing. This coefficient is
expected to be negative, as composite basing reduces the amount of supporting resources
by eliminating redundancies.
A third factor affecting the amount of resources is the characteristics of the
deployed locations. Following the logic employed by the RAND START model, a base
will be identified as either a bare base, or a non-bare base, depending on the presence of
housing, fuel, vehicles and runway equipment (Snyder and Mills, 2004:17). Basing will
be addressed using a dummy variable where a zero indicates a bare base and a one
indicates a non-bare base. This coefficient is expected to be negative, as deploying to a
base with resources present (a non-bare base) will reduce the size of the package.
The duration of the deployment will also be investigated. Many of the resources
required to support a deployment provide support for 30 days with no resupply (Logistics
Readiness Officer Supply Module, 2002: 27). Following this logic, a dummy variable
will be used to identify whether or not the deployment will last for 30 days or more. This
variable has a value of zero if the deployment is less than 30 days, and a value of 1 of the
deployment is 30 days or longer. The coefficient relating to this variable is expected to
be positive, since a longer deployment would require more support.
Finally, information was collected regarding the title, type, date, and location of
each deployment. This additional data serves as reference to the complexity of the
deployment, and can help serve as a reference if more detailed information is required to
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explain non-representative data points and outliers during evaluation of the collected
data.
There will be two models; one for passengers and one for equipment. The models
representing the resources required to support an F-15 deployment is expected to take the
form:
y =Β1 + Β2X1- Β3X2 - Β4X3 + ε

where

(2)

y = number of passenger or short tons of equipment
X1 = number of deployed F-15 aircraft
X2 = 0 if no other aircraft are present, 1 if others are present
X3 = 0 if deployment is under 30 days, 1 if over 30 days
X4 = 0 if the deployed location bare, 1 if it is not
ε = Random error, normally distributed with a mean of zero

In order to perform a regression, five or more observations are required to account
for the degrees of freedom lost by using four independent variables.
Building the Estimators
Data will be extracted from historical data files from Langley AFB, and from
RAF Lakenheath. Files with incomplete data were ignored.
Once the data iss collected, a regression determined the best fit line. The model
will be evaluated to ensure that it meets the underlying assumptions of regression. If a
model cannot meet the assumptions, then the confidence in its results is diminished.
These four key assumptions are detailed by McClave et al (2001:498).
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The first assumption of a regression model is that errors are normally distributed
with a mean of zero. Residuals that are not normally distributed occur because there are
non-random factors in the data set that are unaccounted for. This can be resolved by
transforming the data, or by identifying the additional factors.
The second assumption of regression is that variance of the residual’s probability
distribution is the same for all levels of each of the independent variables. If the variance
of residuals is not consistent at different levels, the beta weights cannot be interpreted
with confidence.
The third assumption is that the errors are independent. If the value of a residual
error is determined by other errors in the vicinity, then by definition it is not random
error. The measure of residual independence is serial correlation. Serial correlation tests
for correlation between neighboring residuals (McClave et al, 2001:797). The test for
serial correlation is the Durbin-Watson test.
The Durbin Watson test examines the hypothesis that there is no first order serial
correlation in the data. The exact sampling distribution of the Durbin-Watson test
statistic “d” is difficult to derive. Thus, there is no unique critical value that will lead to
accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis (McClave et al, 2001:798). Instead of a critical
value, a range of values is provided. In the case of the Durbin-Watson test, a value of 2
means that there is no serial correlation present. However, some degree of serial
correlation can be present and not negatively impact the performance of the model (see
Figure 8).
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Figure 8. Durbin-Watson Critical Value Range
The final key assumption of a regression model is that the independent variables
convey unique information (McClave et al, 2001:650). That is, the variance described by
an independent variable is unique from the variance described by other independent
variables. This potential redundancy in independent variables is called multicollinearity.
A common symptom of high multicollinearity is when the overall F-test for the model
shows a high degree of significance, but there are no significant effects. This is because
the independent variables combine to provide a high degree of explanation of the same
part of the data set.
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Multicollinearity can be tested by examining the shared covariance between each
independent variable, with every other independent variable in the model. While there is
no key statistic to determine when there is an unsatisfactory level of multicollinearity, a
high measure of covariance, coupled with one or more factors being insignificant,
indicates that multiple variables describe the same construct. The solution is to remove
one of the factors from the model and run the model with the reduced factor set.
In order to validate the model and compare the relative success in estimating
resources, a 15 data points test set will be collected, using the same factors as described
above. These points will be entered into the models, and an assessment will be made
regarding the effectiveness of the model’s to predict, with 95% confidence, the number of
passengers and short tons used to support the deployment. This will provide
confirmation as to the power and effectiveness of the model.
Analysis of AFE using Cargo and Passenger Models
Once the data has been shown to sufficiently support the assumptions of
regression, a comparison will be made to the first generation of regressive estimator,
proposed by Goddard (2001). That model was constructed using a similar regression
methodology, but used only one predictor: the number of aircraft. Additionally, it only
described the equipment requirements, foregoing passenger estimations. If the cargo and
passenger models are more effective than the AFE, it should be able to describe a
significantly higher amount of variance.
Since the F-16CJ formed the basis for the exact AFE model, the methodology will
be reapplied to the F-15E. In this case, a regression model will be constructed using the
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number of aircraft as the sole predictor using F15E data. If there is not a significant
increase in the explained variance, then using the less complicated model would be
preferred.
Validation of the Cargo and Passenger Models as a Forecasting Tool
If the cargo and passenger models satisfy the underlying assumptions of a
regression model, that it outperforms the simple regression model presented in the AFE,
and that it explains a large portion of the variance in resource requirements, a validation
of the effectiveness of the model will occur.
This validation will be conducted using 15 additional data points collected from
RAF Lakenheath and Langley AFB during a second data collection effort. The
parameters for each of these deployments will be entered into both AFE-II equations, and
the predicted requirements will be recorded.
The predicted requirements will be inspected first to determine if they are within
a calculated prediction interval. This interval is used to determine a threshold of
performance for the regression model.
The basic idea of a prediction interval is thus to choose a range in the distribution of Y
wherein most of the observations will fall, and then to declare that the next observation
will fall in this range. The usefulness of the prediction interval depends, as always, on the
width of the interval and the needs for precision by the user. (Neter et al, 1996:63)

The measure of precision required in the prediction is represented by alpha (α).
In this case, since forecasting requirements should be precise, and since a small sample
size was used, an alpha of .05 will be used. Conceptually, this means that out of 100
predictions, 95 will fall within the prediction interval. If more than 5 are outside of the
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prediction interval, then the hypothesis that the model successfully predicts resource
estimate with 95% confidence must be rejected.
The equation used in calculating a prediction interval is:
Yh ± t(1-α/2; n-2)s
where

(3)

E(Yh) = The mean value of Y at point h
t = The value derived from the t-Distribution
α = The precision required in the prediction
n = The number of data points in the sample
s = An estimation of the population’s standard deviation, σ

This model allows the calculation of a prediction interval when using a sample
where the population parameter σ, representing the standard deviation, is unknown.
The output from this equation, along with the mean regression line, will be used
to determine whether the model is able to successfully predict, with 95% confidence, the
resources required to support a deployment with a given set of parameters.
Finally, the model will be tested for the proximity of its prediction to actual
deployment data. Since the sample size is relatively small, a wide prediction interval will
result. This is because as the sample size increases, the value of the t-score decreases,
moving the upper and lower bounds of the distribution closer to the mean line.
The specific methods of proximity evaluation will be the mean percentage error
(MPE) and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) of the predicted actual value.
These provide a measure of the degree of variation between the predicted point and the
actual value by providing a quantification of the error as a percentage of the actual.
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The MPE is calculated by differencing the actual and predicted amount, then
dividing the difference by the actual. These values are summed across predictions for
that resource, and then averaged. A mathematical representation of the MPE derivation
is:

MPE =

where

1 n ⎛⎜ X i − Xˆ i
∑
n i =1 ⎜⎝ Xˆ i

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

(4)

Xi = The predicted value for point i
Χ̂ i = The actual value of point i

i = Successive deployments from the validation set of data
n = The number of data points in the sample
The MPE provides an analytical tool to determine the ability of the model to
predict the actual data over time. Values of the MPE can be positive or negative.
Negative numbers indicate a situation where the prediction understated the actual, while
a positive number indicates that the prediction overstated the actual. Numbers closer to
zero indicate a small error in the prediction, while numbers farther from zero indicate a
large error in the prediction.
However, since predictions that are over the actual are canceled out by similar
predictions that understate the actual, another tool must be used to identify the absolute
or total error created by the prediction model. In order to determine the total average
error created by the prediction model, a MAPE analysis will be conducted. The MAPE is
similar to the calculation used for the MPE. However, a key distinction comes from
taking the absolute value when differencing. By accomplishing this all errors are
determined to be positive. This allows a determination of the total error of the model
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since over and understated errors do not cancel out. A representation of the calculation
methodology is:

MAPE =

where

ˆ
⎛
1 n ⎜ Xi − Xi
∑
n i =1 ⎜⎜ Xˆ i
⎝

⎞
⎟
⎟⎟
⎠

(5)

Xi = The predicted value for point i
Χ̂ i = The actual value of point i

i = Successive deployments from the validation set of data
n = The number of data points in the sample

A high MAPE score means that the model is susceptible to high error in its
prediction, but provides no information regarding its tendency to over or under estimate
actual values. Low MAPE scores indicate a model that closely estimates actual values.
Since the MPE provides little information regarding the scale of the absolute
error, and the MAPE provides little information regarding the direction of the estimation
error, both measures will be used in unison to determine model effectiveness. Table 4
provides a description of the logic used to interpret MAPE and MPE values.
Table 4. 2 X 2 Interpretation Matrix for MAPE and MPE

MAPE
MPE

Low
Low Low Error Model
High Not Possible
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High
High errors/cancel out
Over/Under Estimates

A low MPE and a low MAPE is the result of a good model. The error in
prediction is low, and the model tends to slightly over and under estimate in equal
proportions.
A low MPE and a high MAPE results from a model that creates high errors, but
the errors tend to equally over and under estimate the actual value.
A high MPE and a low MAPE does not exist because a high MPE suggests that a
model creates high errors in one direction, and a low MAPE suggests low errors. These
cannot exist simultaneously.
Finally, a model that produces high MPE and high MAPE is a model that creates
large error, systematically under or over estimating the actual value.
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IV. Analysis
Chapter Overview

This research began with the intention of creating a deployment resource
estimation tool, capable of providing quick and accurate assessments of the resources
required to support different F-15E deployments.
Previous chapters have provided justification of the need for rapid resource
estimations, and have provided a context for research in this area. Further, an
investigation into the ability of rule-set models to predict deployment requirements has
been addressed.
This chapter reports the results of the methodology introduced in Chapter III.
This methodology works to develop a robust regression model for use in explaining the
factors involved in determining deployment requirements that can also be used to
forecast the composition of future deployment packages given a specific scenario.
Finally, an evaluation of the model is outlined using a comparison of the mean
percentage error (MPE) and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), and an
evaluation of the Mean Squared Error (MSE) is provided to assess the presence of large
errors in the cargo model’s prediction.
Data Collection

In all, 47 data points were collected; 32 were used in the creation of the model,
and 15 were used during the validation of the model. However, one of the data points
from the set used to create the model was excluded. It was a deployment during 2001 in
support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM from Langley, AFB. This movement
51

occurred during an intensely short planning period. During the movement, no TPFDD or
UTC data was used to drive deployment requirements. Additionally, no information was
available on the duration or nature of the mission. As a result of these factors, the
package that was deployed was larger than a full UTC movement. Since this was an
atypical movement that was not impacted by usual planning constraints, it was dismissed
as an outlier. Since the scope of this research is to estimate deployments utilizing the
Joint Planning Process, this point was consciously omitted.
Identification of Significant Factors

As the data were collected, information about the number of aircraft, the duration
of the deployment and whether other airframes were collocated at the deployed site were
readily available. However, neither location was able to provide data from a base that fit
the START definition of a bare base. Thus, the bare base factor was dropped due to
insufficient data.
Additionally, after examining successive outliers, another factor was identified.
During the initial test, a succession of outliers was removed and analyzed. In each case,
the deployment was supporting an AEF. After collaboration with planners at Langley
AFB, it was determined that the AEF deployment planning process is indeed different
from the process for planning training or wartime deployments. First, the planning
horizon is long, typically 14 months. This allows for more time to consider package
requirements. Additionally, since the AEF movements are programmed far in advance,
and have a very high priority, they are more likely to receive airlift support in quantities
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requested. This scenario differs greatly from the 72-hour implementation of a plan
created using the Joint Planning Process.
Since the AEF planning process is conducted on a 16 month time scale,
comparable to the deliberate planning time scale, and is executed almost exactly as
planned, a factor to assess the significance of the AEF’s long term planning horizon was
included. This factor was added to the process of passenger and cargo model
development. To account for this factor, a dummy variable was designed, such that a
zero meant the deployment was an AEF deployment, and a 1 meant that the deployment
was not due to an AEF. The coefficient of this variable was expected to be positive for
two reasons.
For personnel, an AEF package was expected to be smaller because of the
window available for training personnel. Given a 14 month training window, personnel
could learn to perform more tasks specific to the mission. Additionally, since all
personnel requirements were validated through MAJCOMs, the force numbers within
UTCs, once tailored, are fairly stable. This would indicate that an AEF deployment
would reduce passenger requirements. Finally, non-AEF deployments are often used for
training personnel in their war time competency. Thus, non-AEFs would theoretically
have more personnel in them to maximize the training opportunity. As a result, it is
hypothesized that in an AEF deployment, less personnel would be deployed than in a
non-AEF deployment.
For cargo, it was assumed that more time for planning, meant a more deliberate
consideration of the equipment required to support a given package. This time allows for
planners to identify redundant or unnecessary equipment items. Thus, it was
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hypothesized that an AEF deployment would have less cargo than a similar deployment
that was not in support of an AEF.
Developing the Passenger Model

Based on the data, a regression equation was tested using the number of
passengers as a dependent variable that responds to the values of the four independent
variables.
A best fit line was determined using linear regression.
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Figure 9. Normal Quantile Plot of Passenger Model Residuals

The first check to satisfy the underlying assumptions of regression is to ensure the
residuals are normally distributed. The normal quantile plot (see Figure 9) shows that the
distribution is roughly normal, with a proportionally higher concentration of points in the
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middle, and no points falling outside of the 95% confidence interval. The Shapiro-Wilk
test statistic was used to determine the fit of the residuals to a normal distribution. The
Shapiro-Wilk tests the hypothesis that the distribution in question and a normal
distribution are the same. Thus, a Shapiro-Wilk test score with a P-value of less than .05
will result in rejecting the null hypothesis that the distribution is normal, and results in
the model violating the regressive assumption of normality. The Shapiro-Wilk test
statistic for the passenger model is .978 with a p-value of .7950. Thus the null hypothesis
is not rejected, and the distribution is considered normal.
Second, a scatter plot of residuals is used to examine the equivariance of the
residuals. The second assumption of regression is that the variance of the residual’s
probability distribution is the same for all levels of the independent variable. (see Figure
10)
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Figure 10. Residual by Predicted Plot for Passenger Model

The scatter plot of residuals based on the number of passengers predicted
provides a visual evaluation of equivariance. Since the residuals seem to fall evenly
around the mean, with not significant increasing or decreasing trends, the model seems to
produce equivariant residuals. This satisfies the second assumption of a regression
model
With evidence supporting sufficient equivariance and normal residuals, an
investigation of serial correlation must be conducted. Serial correlation is a measure of
dependence among neighboring data points, and was tested using the Durbin-Watson test
for first order serial correlation.
The Durbin Watson test examines the hypothesis that there is no first order serial
correlation in the data. The Durbin-Watson test statistic and the relative critical values
are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Serial Correlation for Passenger Model
dl
Model
Durbin
du
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Passenger

Watson
1.77

1.64987

1.198

Since the test statistic falls between du and two, the null is not rejected, and the
assumption of no significant serial correlation is maintained.
The final check in ensuring a sound regression model is the check for
multicollinearity. As discussed in Chapter III, multicollinearity is a measure of the
relationship between two or more independent variables; that is, do they measure the
same thing? A quantified assessment of shared covariance is used to determine the
amount of shared variance between predictors. (see Table 6)
Table 6. Shared Covariance of Passenger and Cargo Predictors
Planning
Duration
Co-located
# AC
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
1
0.1639
0.1669
0.2006
# AC
Planning
0.1639
1
-0.5078
-0.1679
Dummy
Duration
0.1669
-0.5078
1
0.0486
Dummy
Co-located
0.2006
-0.1679
0.0486
1
Dummy

As was the case in serial correlation, there are no critical thresholds to determine
the amount of shared variance between independent variables; a visual assessment
determines whether the presence of multicollinearity threatens the performance of the
model.
In this analysis, larger numbers represent a greater amount of covariance. The
shared variance between the Duration Dummy variable and the Planning Dummy
variable is high. However, considering that both of the variables are significant in the
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model, it isn’t high enough to determine that the variables are measuring the same thing.
Thus, the model appears relatively free from significant covariance. Additionally, the
cargo formulation uses the same data, with no additional factors; the multicollinearity test
is identical for both cases.
Finally, with the underlying assumption of a regression model successfully
fulfilled, the effects of the regression equation can be investigated.
An investigation into the significance of each of the four independent variables
shows that all are statistically significant contributors to the number of passengers
deployed. (see Table 7)
Table 7. Parameter Estimates for Passenger Model

Term
Intercept
# AC
Planning Dummy (0= AEF, 1=
not AEF)
Co-located Dummy
(0=no,1=yes)
Duration Dummy (0<30, 1 >=30)

Estimate Std Error t Ratio
68.30149 16.60618
4.11
8.903698 1.182325
7.53

Prob>|t
|
0.0004
<.0001

-29.6854 13.01406

-2.28

0.0317

-24.7644 10.47851
35.10655 11.06773

-2.36
3.17

0.0266
0.0041

Finally, an assessment of the performance is conducted by determining the ability
of the regression model to explain variation within the data. (see Table 8)
Table 8. Summary of Fit for Passenger Model
R-Square
0.80709
R-Square Adj
0.774938
Root Mean Square Error 23.99245
Mean of Response
134.4828
Observations (or Sum
Wgts)
29

The passenger model explains approximately 77% of the variance in the number
of passengers deployed. This suggests that the four independent variables are critical to
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providing an estimate of the number of passengers required to support a deployment.
However, approximately 23% of the variance is not explained. Since the 23% of
unexplained variance in the model is considered to be randomly distributed error, a
prediction interval will be calculated. The prediction interval will provide a more robust
prediction of the resources required by acknowledging an expected level of error about
the mean.
The model representing the number of passengers required to support an F-15
deployment is:
y =68.30 + 8.90X1 - 29.81X2 - 24.76X3 + 35.11X4

where

(3)

y = number of passengers
X1 = number of deployed F-15 aircraft
X2 = 0 if no other aircraft are present, 1 if others are present
X3 = 0 if deployment is less30 days, 1 if 30 days or more
X4 = 0 if the deployment is AEF, 1 if it is not AEF

Developing the Cargo Module
As with the passenger model the independent variables were used to fit a line

through the data, minimizing the sum of the squared error terms. An initial investigation
into the significance of the variables indicates that one of the identified variables is nonsignificant in predicting cargo requirements (see Table 9).
Table 9. Preliminary Parameter Estimates – Cargo Model
Prob>|t
Term
Estimate Std Error t Ratio |
Intercept
80.85807 14.24198
5.68 <.0001
# AC
3.981304 1.013999
3.93 0.0006
Planning Dummy (0= AEF, 1= -64.9918 11.16127
-5.82 <.0001
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not AEF)
Duration Dummy (0<30, 1
>=30)
Co-located Dummy
(0=no,1=yes)

10.3413 9.492031

1.09

0.2868

-25.493 8.986697

-2.84

0.0091

An examination of the significance of these variables highlights the fact that the
duration of a deployment is not a significant factor in determining the amount of cargo
required to support a mission. Other factors may impact this phenomenon. For example,
some cargo may be transported at a later date as resupply. In any case,, the effect of the
duration of a deployment will not be included in the cargo model.
The first check to satisfy the underlying assumptions of regression is ensure the
residuals are normally distributed. The normal quantile plot (see Figure 11) shows that
the distribution is roughly normal, with a proportionally higher concentration of points in
the middle, and no points falling outside f the 95% confidence interval.
Using the significant variables, normality of residuals was addressed. The
normality of the cargo data residuals was not as well defined as it was for passengers (see
Figure 11).
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Figure 11. Normal Quantile Plot of Cargo Model Residuals

In the distribution displayed in Figure 11, all points stayed within the 95%
confidence intervals, fulfilling the underlying requirements for normally distributed
residuals. Additionally, the Shapiro –Wilk score is .936 and the p-value is .077. Since
the Shapiro-Wilk assumes similarity between distributions, a P-value above .05 results in
accepting the hypothesis that the distribution is normal.
Second, a scatter plot of residuals is used to examine the equivariance of the
residuals. The second assumption of regression is that variance of the residual’s
distribution is near equal (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Residual for Predicted Plot for Cargo Model

One data point appears to defy the equivariance of the set. Unfortunately, the
deployment occurred in 2001, and no one in the organization remembers the deployment,
or why it was so small comparatively. However, regression is a robust modeling
technique that can withstand a single point deviating from the assumption. There does
not appear to be a systematic variation, so the regression model beta weights are still
acceptable.
The third check is for serial correlation using the Durbin Watson test. The
Durbin-Watson test statistics and the relative critical values are shown in Table 10.
Table 10. Serial Correlation for Cargo Model
dl
Model
Durbin-Watson
du
1.4384025
1.64987
1.198
Cargo

Since the test statistic is greater than dl the assumption that the null hypothesis
assuming no serial correlation is accepted. However, since there is no absolute threshold
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dividing a high and low serial correlation, the analysis includes values between du and dl.
This range includes values that indicate the need to exercise caution. That is, while the
null is accepted, meaning that the model doesn’t have serial correlation, the model shows
a higher level than expected. This indicates that more information may reverse the
finding that serial correlation is present (McClave et al, 2001:799). While this isn’t
optimum, it does not prevent the use of the results for prediciton.
With assumptions necessary to apply a regression equation satisfied, the results of
the regression equation can be investigated. An investigation into the significance of
each of the three remaining independent variables shows that each is a significant
contributor to the short tons of cargo deployed. (see Table 11)
Table 11. Parameter Estimates for Cargo Model

Term
Intercept
# AC
Planning Dummy (0= AEF, 1= not AEF)
Co-located Dummy (0=no,1=yes)

Estimate
87.56963
4.327508
-71.7911
-26.6747

Prob>|t
Std Error t Ratio |
12.88862
6.79 <.0001
0.966513
4.48 0.0001
9.287884
-7.73 <.0001
8.954293
-2.98 0.0064

Finally, an assessment of the performance is conducted by determining the ability
of the regression model to explain variation within the data. (see Table 12)
Table 12. Summary of Fit for Cargo Model
R-Square
0.73457
R-Square Adj
0.702719
Root Mean Square Error
20.65347
Mean of Response
58.55862
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
29

The cargo model explains approximately 70% of the variance in the number of
passengers deployed. This suggests that the three independent variables are critical to
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providing an estimate of the short tons of cargo required to support a deployment.
However, as in the passenger model, approximately 30% of the variance is not explained.
As a result, a model will be used to determine the mean number of short tons of
equipment that will be deployed to support a mission, and a 95% prediction interval will
allow for significant predictions in the midst of potential error.
The model for the tons of cargo required to support an F-15 deployment is:
y =87.57 + 4.33X1 - 71.79X2 - 26.67X3

where

(4)

y = Short tons of cargo
X1 = number of deployed F-15 aircraft
X2 = 0 if no other aircraft are present, 1 if others are present
X3 = 0 if the deployment is AEF, 1 if it is not AEF

AFE Evaluation

Since the AFE model proposed by Goddard (2001) was constructed using only
one factor, it has is limited in its predictive ability. The AFE model significantly
underperforms the more robust cargo and passenger models when tested usind the present
data ser. This phenomena occurs even without the AEF data that did not exist at the time
of the AFE construction, even when it is constructed without any data from AEF
deployments. Its ability to explain the variance is significantly lower (.248 adjusted Rsquared) leaving a very significant amount of unexplained variance (see Table 13). As a
result, the model will not be investigated further, on the grounds that it does not explain a
significant level of variance.
Table 13. Summary Table for AFE
R-Square
0.287791
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R-Square Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum
Wgts)

0.248224
12.12925
41.17
25

The increase in explained variance provides a significant argument to the cargo
and passenger models serving as a better estimator for the resources required to support
an F-15 deployment. It’s inclusion of more factors provides a more flexible planning tool
when certain parameters of the deployment may be known or when multiple scenarios are
compared. Finally, the passenger model provides more information critical to planning.
Passenger and Cargo Model Validation

In order to evaluate the models developed in the first part of this study, a second
set of data were collected. These data was used to test the predictive power of the
statistical models. While the first part validated the ability of the models to explain the
factors and their contributions to resource requirements, the models still needed to be
evaluated for their performance against actual deployment data. This validation was a
multi-step process, testing statistically significant predictions, and the errors in the
forecast.

A validation set of data was used in this step of the analysis. The data test set was
collected independently of the original data set. The coded values of this set are provided
in Table 14.

Cargo
76.2
110.1
111.2

Table 14. Values of the Test Data Set
Pax
#AC Aggregate Duration
141
6
0
1
117
6
0
0
152
8
0
0
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AEF
1
0
0

65.7
121.3
61.1
79.6
79.2
129.7
134.3
73.3
59.9
92.1
76.2
84.2

90
94
77
137
133
149
157
176
79
131
182
196

8
4
4
12
12
8
12
12
4
16
16
18

1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

Assessment of Statistical Significance

To further test that the model works properly, the validation set will be used. In
this case the actual deployment resources will be evaluated to see if they are within the
bounds of the models prediction interval. Given a 95% prediction interval, a successful
model will be able to contain the actual resource quantity within the associated interval
95% of the time. This assessment determines the ability of the model to perform under
circumstances with different parameters. That is, the model was developed using 32 data
points, but can the model predict the actual deployment requirements using 15 data points
from independent deployments?
The passenger module was able to successfully capture the actual number of
passengers deploying in all 15 cases. That is, in every case the actual deployment
requirement was between the upper confidence interval (UCI) and the lower confidence
interval (LCI). (see Table 15)
Table 15. Passenger Model Significance

Predicted Actual

#AC

AEF Duration
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Colocated

LCI

UCI

Actual
Within
Predictio
n

92.0
121.7
139.5
114.8
103.9
79.2
120.7
150.4
139.5
175.1
150.4
79.2
186.0
156.3
174.1

141
117
152
90
94
77
137
133
149
157
176
79
131
182
196

6
6
8
8
4
4
12
12
8
12
12
4
16
16
18

1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1

0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

38.7
62.5
79.8
58.6
44.8
22.5
69.2
92.9
79.8
113.4
92.9
22.5
125.7
103.3
119.7

145.3
181.0
199.2
171.0
163.1
135.8
172.2
207.9
199.2
236.9
207.9
135.8
246.3
209.3
228.5

Interval?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

This analysis shows that the prediction interval was very effective in capturing the
actual resource requirements. However, the meaningfulness of this test is somewhat
limited. For example, for the first data point, the number of passengers that would have
been captured in the prediction interval ranged from 39 to 145. This is a wide range that
would not provide enough information to effectively assess transportation requirements.
The cargo module was also able to predict, with 95% confidence, the number of
short tons of cargo that would be required to deploy to support and F-15 deployment.
This indicates the success of the model in predicting resources requirements.
Additionally, the model was provided a confidence interval that captured the actual
resource requirement 100% of the time. However, the results were similar to those
produced by the passenger estimation model. This analysis is described in Table 16.
Table 16. Cargo Module Significance

Predicted Actual #AC AEF Duration Aggregate
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LCI

UCI

Actual
Within
Predictio
n

39.75
104.75
112.71
87.22
96.78
71.29
38.15
103.14
112.71
128.63
103.14
71.29
119.07
54.07
62.04

76.2
110.1
111.2
65.7
121.3
61.1
79.6
79.2
129.7
134.3
73.3
59.9
92.1
76.2
84.2

6
6
8
8
4
4
12
12
8
12
12
4
16
16
18

1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1

0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

0.0
53.9
61.5
39.0
46.0
22.7
0.0
53.8
61.5
75.6
53.8
22.7
67.3
8.6
15.4

85.5
155.5
163.9
135.4
147.5
119.8
82.3
152.4
163.9
181.6
152.4
119.8
170.8
99.5
108.7

Interval?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

One concern regarding the significance of these predictions must be identified.
While the supplementary data and the corresponding significance analysis provide a basis
for the models use and applicability, the small sample size used in the original data set
results in wide intervals.
For example, in the first case, the prediction interval spans from zero to eightyfive short tons. This is a wide margin, leaving room for potentially large errors. While
this margin serves to evaluate the statistical significance of the models predictions, it
does little to evaluate the practical significance of the predictions. Satisfying the
statistical significance serves as an important foundation for forecasting, the ability to
accurately predict resource requirements is what planners need. As a result, the model
will be evaluated for its ability to precisely predict requirements.

68

Examination of Mean Percentage Error and the Mean Absolute Error Percentage

The second approach used to assess the performance of the model will be
conducted using the mean percentage error (MPE) and the mean absolute percentage
error (MAPE).
For this analysis, a value of 20% was selected to serve as the threshold between
moderate and low error. The threshold for high error was determined to be 30%.
These thresholds were selected in order to provide a very conservative evaluation
of acceptable error in the prediction term. Scores greater than 30%, or less and -20% are
considered high, meaning that there is a significant amount of difference between the
predicted and the actual resource requirements. A score between 20% and 30% is
considered moderate. Scores closer to zero are considered low error. These thresholds
will allow for an assessment of the relative accuracy and reliability of the models to
produce resource estimates.

Table 17. MPE and MAPE Calculation for the Passenger Module
PaxActual
Pax-Predicted
PE
APE
141
92.0
-34.72
34.72
117
121.7
4.04
4.04
152
139.5
-8.20
8.20
90
114.8
27.52
27.52
94
103.9
10.55
10.55
77
79.2
2.79
2.79
137
120.7
-11.90
11.90
133
150.4
13.07
13.07
149
139.5
-6.35
6.35
157
175.1
11.56
11.56
176
150.4
-14.56
14.56
79
79.2
0.19
0.19
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131
182
196

186.0
156.3
174.1
MPE
MAPE

41.98
-14.11
-11.16
0.71%

41.98
14.11
11.16
14.18%

As indicated in Table 17, both scores were considered low for the passenger
module estimations, indicating a relatively high level of precision and accuracy in the
models prediction of passenger requirements. The model makes low errors in total
(measured by the MAPE), and tends to over and under estimate actual requirements
equally (measured by the MPE). The result is a model that should prove very effective in
predicting passenger requirements required to support and F-15 deployment in a given
scenario.
With the passenger model successfully providing predictions with low errors, a
similar exercise was conducted regarding the number of tons of cargo. The MAPE/MPE
analysis of the predictions provided by the cargo model can be seen in Table 18.

Table 18. MPE and MAPE Calculation for the Cargo Module
CargoCargoActual
Predicted
PE
APE
76.2
39.75
-47.83
47.83
110.1
104.75
-4.86
4.86
111.2
112.71
1.36
1.36
65.7
87.22
32.75
32.75
121.3
96.78
-20.21
20.21
61.1
71.29
16.68
16.68
79.6
38.15
-52.07
52.07
79.2
103.14
30.23
30.23
129.7
112.71
-13.10
13.10
134.3
128.63
-4.22
4.22
73.3
103.14
40.71
40.71
59.9
71.29
19.02
19.02

70

92.1
76.2
84.2

119.07
54.07
62.04
MPE
MAPE

29.28
-29.04
-26.32
-1.84%

29.28
29.04
26.32
24.51%

This model produces a very low MPE, but a moderate MAPE. This means that
the model has moderate estimation errors, but they tend to equally over and
underestimate the actual values. As such, the model successfully predicts the cargo
requirements to support a deployment within 24 percent. Given a moderate level of
error, it is necessary to analyze the composition of the error between the predicted and
actual cargo requirements. While the MAPE/MPE analysis provided a view of the
average errors, it did not provide enough analysis regarding the characteristics of
individual error. To conduct this analysis, the error terms are plotted in a distribution.
The errors between the prediction and actual cargo requirements are shown in Figure 13.

50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30

Figure 13. Cargo Prediction Errors

These error terms indicate that most of the error terms are between -30 and 30;
which is relatively close to the predicted quantity. However, a few of the terms are
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located far from the predicted quantity, both above and below the predicted level. These
values are magnified by plotting the distribution of the squared errors (see Figure 14).
This may indicate the absence of another significant factor in the models.

1500

1000

500

0

Figure 14. Squared Cargo Prediction Errors

The squared errors indicate that most of the predictions are close to the actual
requirements. However, one outlier and another point call far outside the distribution.
This means that two errors are significantly increasing the error, inflating the MAPE.
Removing these two points significantly reduces the MAPE (see Table 19).
Table 19. Cargo Error Evaluation Without Two Large Error Terms
CargoCargoActual
Predicted
PE
APE
110.1
104.75
-4.86
4.86
111.2
112.71
1.36
1.36
65.7
87.22
32.75
32.75
121.3
96.78
-20.21
20.21
61.1
71.29
16.68
16.68
79.2
103.14
30.23
30.23
129.7
112.71
-13.10
13.10
134.3
128.63
-4.22
4.22
73.3
103.14
40.71
40.71
59.9
71.29
19.02
19.02
92.1
119.07
29.28
29.28
76.2
54.07
-29.04
29.04
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84.2

62.04

-26.32
4.817551

MPE
MAPE

26.32
17.85127

Removing the two data points further reduces the MAPE, resulting in a model that produces low error.
These two errors were created by deployments that occurred in 1999 and 2001 respectively. This analysis
may indicate that another factor has a significant impact on deployment resource requirements. Details
regarding the logistics planning leading up to the deployment were not available, so an analysis as to the
reason for a large departure from other deployment data was not feasible. Additionally, these data points
cannot be dropped from the analysis, as they cannot be identified as non-routine, as was the case with the
non-TPFDD data point that was eliminated. While they cannot be dropped, this analysis reinforces the fact
that the model generally is accurate in predicting deployment requirements with low error.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the findings of the research. Each of
the investigative questions developed for this effort are addressed and supported.
Limitations of the research are addressed, followed by an evaluation of the results.
Finally, topics for recommended future research are presented.
Investigative Question One

What are the significant factors determining the number of passengers and
amount of cargo required to support a deployment?
The analysis was able to identify multiple factors that had a significant impact on
the size of the final deployment package. The number of deploying aircraft, the presence
of other aircraft at the deployed location, and whether the deployment was in support of
an AEF were significant factors for both the Cargo and Passenger Models. Additionally,
the duration of the deployment was a significant factor in determining the number of
passengers that were required to deploy.
Investigative Question Two

How effective have previous models been in estimating real-world deployment
requirements?
Due to the approach used, previous models have been largely unsuccessful in
determining the resources that actually deploy in support of an F-15 mobility operation.
The decision rule-sets utilized by the UTC-DT effort did not account for potential
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differences that occur between different planners. Additionally, its reliance on
information from WRM and BCAT information reduces its ability to assist in deliberate
planning. During deliberate planning, information regarding theatre and location are
often not specific. Third, it does not provide predictions regarding the number of
passengers required, missing 30% of our deployment resources required. Finally, it only
includes maintenance UTCs in its calculation. As a result, it does not provide predictions
regarding the size of the entire package, missing many of the resources required to
support the deployment (i.e. services, transportation, civil engineering).
The RAND Minmx series also utilizes decision rules to predict resource
requirements. It also is based on the opinions of a few individuals, creating the same
questions of whether their planning factors are representative of all planners.
Additionally, the plan only accounts for maintenance equipment and does not provide
passenger predictions. Finally, it utilizes only the number of aircraft deploying as its
planning factor. This greatly limits its potential, as there are other significant factors that
affect the size of the deployment.
The AFE developed by Goddard (2001) utilized a similar methodology as this
research, however, its inclusion of only one significant factor results in an inferior model.
Finally, the RAND START model attempts to selected UTCs at the beginning of
the planning process, speeding the time required for planning. While it does compile
non-maintenance UTCs, it does not provide tailoring estimates, but rather identifies full
UTCs that may be selected for deployment. Additionally, it only allows for fighters to be
tasked in increments of six. Since fighters may be tasked to deploy in intervals other
than six, the ability to properly estimate deployment requirements is significantly
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impaired. Finally, the rule-sets employed by the model were based on antiquated
MEFPAK dated from December 2001. In fact, the F-15E packages that the tool selected
are no longer in the inventory, having been replaced by ACC Right-Sized UTCs. As a
result, the START does not provide accurate resource estimates.
Investigative Question Three

Can a model be constructed that is more robust that existing models?
Utilizing a methodology that analyzes actual deployment data using a best-fit
regression line, a more accurate prediction tool was developed. The tool performed very
well in its validation phase, producing low to moderate error in prediction. While the
passenger module is very effective in its predictions, the cargo is not as successful.
Based on the analysis of error, it is possible that another factor may be involved that
occasionally creates large differences in the resources required.
The presence of relatively low prediction errors, though, and provides a much
more effective prediction tool than other models produced with this goal in mind. While
it is far from the final solution in deployment planning, it provides a vast improvement,
and can contribute to more efficient planning.
Investigative Question Four

What factors must future models account for to produce effective estimates?
Future models must be developed to consider all of the factors identified in the
first question. In addition, decision-rule sets should be created to allow for flexibility and
individual differences planning. Another critical factor is that future models include all
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of the resources required to support a deployment, and not focus solely on maintenance.
A prediction that ignores portions of the package will not produce usable results.
Investigative Question Five

What precision and significance can a regression model provide regarding
resource estimations?
It seems that regression may be a helpful tool to use for resource estimation.
Using the factors that were identified, it was able to produce statistically significant
predictions in 100% of the validation data set. Additionally, it was able to provide
estimations regarding the amount of resources required that were either low or moderate
in error. In the case of passengers, the model was able to predict with 85.82% accuracy
the number of people required to deploy. With respect to cargo, predictions were 75.49%
accurate in deployment requirements. A thorough review of the literature did not
uncover another tool that provided estimates of this precision.
Limitations

The conclusions in this study have limitations that may affect the performance of
the model. First, this research only deals with F-15 aircraft, and does not apply to other
airframes. This investigation attempts to establish a methodology that could be applied
to other necessary combat platforms (tanks, airframes, hospitals, depots, etc). In order to
predict the required airlift, or to hasten planning, tools would be required for each
potential platform. Without information regarding all other platforms, this tool is of little
use.
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Second, this model does not account for items deployed from other locations to
support an F-15 package (barriers, TALCE, etc). This study is taken from the
perspective of the deploying location, not from the deployed location. As such, the
estimations provided give information about the resources that needs to be moved to a
location, but no information regarding the resources needed for support at that location.
This methodology fails to give exact resource estimation, but provides a flexible range
for planners to use when planning to mobilize forces. As a result, the model does not
provide specifics regarding what resources will be deployed, only an aggregate
estimation regarding how much is required.
Third, this model was developed using a very small sample size. While it meets
the minimum size required for the number of variables tested and predicts well given a
set of test data, the beta values of the variables may be significantly changed if a larger
data set was collected. In a similar fashion, the data was collected from two bases over
the last five years. It is possible that local policy or ingrained organizational habits have
a significant effect on the results. It is possible that the data collected is not
representative of other F-15E bases. Additionally, since data were not included for all
aircraft quantities (e.g. 1, 3, 5 or 25 aircraft deployed) extreme caution must be exercised
when using the model to predict deployments in these quantities.
Finally, this model does not attempt to reduce, direct or optimize the deployment
package. The scope of this research was to explain what actually happens. As a result,
inefficient planning may be accepted as the norm. This model made no attempt to change
the tailoring process, only to quantify it and use that analysis to streamline planning.
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Implications

This research shows that accurate planning factors can be developed using
statistical methods. In turn, this methodology can be used to improve the Joint Planning
Process. First, rapid COA comparisons can occur. This allows for more accurate
transportation feasibility assessments to occur early in the planning process. As a result,
feasible COAs will not be dismissed as a result of poor planning factors.
Additionally, accurate airlift requirements can be developed early in the planning
process. This would allow for HQ USTRANSCOM to begin scheduling early in the
process, before tailoring occurred at the base and MAJCOM level. By using planning
factors that closely match actual deployment requirements, the planning process will be
more accurate, quick, and will better support our expeditionary posture.
Future Research

Future research is required to develop and architecture for making transportation
feasibility analysis more accurate and rapid. In order to develop this architecture, other
deployable platforms will have to be identified and quantified if an accurate picture of all
of the airlift requirements is to be developed. While it is beneficial to have accurate
information regarding the F-15E, it does little to determine the feasibility of plans that
contain other capabilities.
Additionally, other significant factors could be identified and added to the
regression models as independent variables. While this research provided a large
explanation of the variance in deployment resources, an additional factor or two may
reduce the error in prediction that these models produce.
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Similarly, future research could seek to reproduce these results using ordinal,
discrete or continuous variables, rater than dummy variables. By elaborating the
duration, type of deployment, or type of platform that is collocated, a more robust
explanation of variance may be found.
Finally, future research could be developed to combine the decision rule-set
approach with the regression results. By combining these methodologies, it is possible to
provide both a prediction tool, and an automated tailoring tool that closely estimates the
actual resource requirements. By combining these approaches, efficiency would be
gained by combining the planning at the Joint level, and the time to tailor UTCs that
occurs at the base level.
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Appendix A: RAF Lakenheath AFWUS
UTC

UNIT

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

9ACP5

0048FTRWG

9ACZZ

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

9ACP1

0048FTRWG

9ACP4

0048FTRWG

9ACP7

0048FTRWG

6KAAE

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KTD0

0048FTRWG

9AAGG

0048FTRWG

9AEMP

0048FTRWG

9AEMP

0048FTRWG

9AEMP

0048FTRWG

9AEMQ

0048FTRWG

9AMEA

0048FTRWG

CSFAL

0048FTRWG

CSFAN

0048FTRWG

ORIGIN
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
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PAX

Cycle 5

1

AEF01

1

AEF01

1

AEF01

1

AEF01

3

AEF01

2

AEF01

1

AEF03

3

AEF03

2

AEF03

0

AEF03

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

5

AEF04

10

AEF04

10

AEF04

10

AEF04

5

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

0

AEF04

CSFAP

0048FTRWG

HFZZZ

0048FTRWG

RFGAE

0048FTRWG

XFFC1

0048FTRWG

XFFC1

0048FTRWG

XFFC2

0048FTRWG

XFFC2

0048FTRWG

XFFC4

0048FTRWG

XFFG1

0048FTRWG

XFFG2

0048FTRWG

XFFG2

0048FTRWG

XFFG7

0048FTRWG

XFFGZ

0048FTRWG

XFFJ3

0048FTRWG

XFFJ3

0048FTRWG

XFFJ3

0048FTRWG

XFFJ8

0048FTRWG

XFFJP

0048FTRWG

XFFJP

0048FTRWG

XSMA1

0048FTRWG

XSMA2
UTC

0048FTRWG
UNIT

XSMA3

0048FTRWG

XSMA3

0048FTRWG

XSMA3

0048FTRWG

XSMA4

0048FTRWG

XSMA6
9ACP5

0048FTRWG
0048FTRWG

LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
ORIGIN
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
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3

AEF04

4

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

2

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

2

AEF04

2

AEF04

2

AEF04

2

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1
PAX

AEF04
EAFC5

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1

AEF04

1
3

AEF04
AEF05

6KAAE

0048FTRWG

6KAAE

0048FTRWG

9ACP5

0048FTRWG

9AEMP

0048FTRWG

9AEMP

0048FTRWG

9AEMP

0048FTRWG

9AEMQ

0048FTRWG

CSFAK

0048FTRWG

CSFAL

0048FTRWG

CSFAL

0048FTRWG

CSFAL

0048FTRWG

HFZZZ

0048FTRWG

RFBZZ

0048FTRWG

RFGAE

0048FTRWG

XFFC1

0048FTRWG

XFFC1

0048FTRWG

XFFC2

0048FTRWG

XFFC2

0048FTRWG

XFFC3

0048FTRWG

XFFG2

0048FTRWG

XFFG2

0048FTRWG

XFFG6

0048FTRWG

XFFGZ

0048FTRWG

XFFJ3

0048FTRWG

XFFJ3

0048FTRWG

XFFJ3
XFFJJ

0048FTRWG
0048FTRWG

H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
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1

AEF07

1

AEF07

3

AEF07

10

AEF07

10

AEF07

10

AEF07

5

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

4

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

2

AEF07

2

AEF07

2
1

AEF07
AEF07

XFFJP

0048FTRWG

XFFJP

0048FTRWG

XFFJP

0048FTRWG

XFFJZ

0048FTRWG

XSMA2

0048FTRWG

XSMA3

0048FTRWG

XSMA3

0048FTRWG

9ACP2

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

6KDB4

0048FTRWG

H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
LAKENHEAT
H
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1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

1

AEF07

3

AEF09

1

AEF10

1

AEF10

1

AEF10

1

AEF10
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